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Th~ Future of Generalized Systems 
of Classification 
IT IS FASHIONABLE at present to dismiss 
the future development of generalized 
classification as if there could be no such 
thing-as if no synthesis were ever pos-
, sible again because no one can see any 
unifying factor or factors in the prolifer-
ation of subjects with which we have to 
deal. This is equivalent to saying that 
the sky is less blue because the blind man 
does not see it. There will be new gen-
eralized classification systems in the fu-
ture for the simple reason that we have 
to have them. And anything we have to 
have sooner or later is found. 
George Gaylord Simpson, the verte-
brate paleontologist, points out that clas-
sification in zoology has proceeded alter-
nately by stages of analysis and synthesis, 
carried out by men who might be cate-
gorized as "lumpers" and "splitters."1 
In library classification, by analogy, the 
older systematizers, Dewey, Bliss and oth-
ers, would be "lumpers." Those who 
make faceted classifications and special 
subject analysis systems of all kinds are 
"splitters." When the "splitters" have 
finished analyzing the new alignment 
of parts that make up the sum total of 
human knowledge-an analysis which 
must be performed if we are to make any 
use at all of the mechanical and elec-
tronic aids now available to us-there is 
no reason to believe that a new synthesis 
cannot or will not be made. It is his-
torically true that the impasse of one age 
is solved in the next, or the one after 
the next. The only fault, a very human 
one present in every generation, is that 
impatient men grow hopeless or even 
• 
1 George Gaylord Simpson, "The Principles of 
Classification and a Classification of Mammals," 
Bulletin of the American Museum of Natt,ral tHis-
tory, LXXXV (October 1945), 22-24 . . 
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antagonistic because they cannot see the 
solution in their own lifetimes. 
In classification, as in any other disci-
pline, one must lay groundwork for fu-
ture development. Even if it is possible 
to be clairvoyant to the extent of pre-
dicting correctly what form future de-
velopment must take, it is still necessary 
to take steps to get there. An Einstein, 
for instance, will hit upon "some great 
unifying idea from which one can de-
duce consequences that can ultimately 
be bought into agreement ... with ob-
served and measurable phenomena."2 
But even an Einstein does not build on 
nothing. He takes account of all the abor-
tive, inconclusive, tentative, incomplete, 
or even rejected solutions of his prede-
cessors. Thus fortified with knowledge of 
the major blind alleys, at least, he can 
lay out his course. It is the duty of those 
now working in classification to discover 
and explore all possible approaches so 
that valuable negative as well as pqsitive 
evidence will be available for the ulti-
mate synthesizer. 
This is not to say that all current work 
in classification will be fruitless or that 
things will necessarily proceed so slowly 
that a synthesis is impossible before the 
end of the century. It is to say that 
avenues not yet considered must be ex-
plored and that work already begun 
must be carried much further. Ideas, no 
matter how bizarre, deserve .considerft-
2 Morris R. Cohen, American Tho"ttght, a Critical 
Sketch (Glencoe, Illinois : Free Press, 1954), P· : 81. 
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tion, because, with any research, we nev-
er know exactly where we are heading. 
Nor do we know which line of develop-
ment will bear the ultimate prize. 
Essentially classification is the process 
of taking identifiable entities and relat-
ing them in one way or another to each 
other. These items inay be anything the 
mind distinguishes as an entity in itself. 
Since the mind is rather free in coalesc-
ing raw material of all types into entities, 
this means that anything "thinkable" is 
classifiable. 
Past syntheses almost exclusively have 
been constructed in a dendritic pattern 
-an inverted tree-from general to spe-
cific. The tree has been delineated as a 
plane figure and treated as if division 
were the only method of construction. 
Many of the writers who look with hor-
ror upon classification as a tool for or-
ganizirtg knowledge see only this type of 
deductive system and identify all classifi-
cation with it. 
A different approach is to build new 
generalized classification systems from 
collections of particulars, gathered by 
observation, ordered by reasoned crite-
ria, and formed by induction into gener-
alities as an ascending scale. These gen-
eralities can then be tested through hy-
pothesis and deduction, and finally con-
clusions derived from the process, which, 
when tested and verified by further ob-
servation, will provide a solid basis for 
a more accurate representation of the 
world in which we live. This is essential-
ly the scientific method, defined in very 
simple terms. Note that the main classes 
which will result from such a process are 
not predicted or predictable in advance. 
Such a system, however, does not pre-
sent a perfect picture of knowledge be-
cause it, too, usually ends in a dendritic 
pattern, although sometimes the net re-
sults are expressed in chains or even in 
chains made up from intermediary ma-
trix or lattice analysis patterns. Some-
thing vital has been left out. This is a 
study of the very nature of the material 
to be described. In the final analysis, it 
is this nature which will determine the 
system of classification. Any system 
which ignores actual makeup of indi-
vidual subjects, with all their ramifica-
tions, is doomed from the start. 
The universe we live in is apparently 
open and genuinely infinite, both infi-
nitely big and infinitely small. Data, 
laws, methods, theories in all fields are 
partially and imperfectly known. On one 
hand, the possibility of discovery seems 
unending. On the other hand, the use of 
creative imagination appears limitless.' 
While the idea of progress as a funda-
mental pervading force has been some-
what shaken as an accepted philosophic 
view in the last two decades, there is no 
corresponding diminution in either cre-
ativity or discovery, both of which are 
highly individualistic matters and prob-
ably not related to progress as an ideal. 
It is the job of classification to show 
the waxing and waning of ideals as well 
as ideas, since the spirit of the times, its 
Zeitgeist~ adds dimension to any aspect 
of the sum total of human knowledge. 
For reasons not entirely clear, this Zeit-
geist has usually been ignored, especially. 
in classification involving the sciences, 
medicine and technology, although it 
exists in these areas just as much as in 
the humanities. The totality of the intel-
lectual atmosphere in each era deter-
mines to a large extent what shall be 
accomplished in that era. This totality, 
which is a dimension external to the in-
dividual, can be both narrow, represent-
ing the sum total of knowledge in a given 
field 1 of research, or it can be broad, re-
flecting the generally-held attitudes, mo-
tivation, philosophical outlook, mores, 
and such of a period of time. 
There is also an internal factor which 
adds dimension to classification. This is 
the individual's own world...outlook, his 
Weltanschauung~ which affects his per-
sonal motivation, intuitive capacity, and 
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imagination. This results from learning, 
influence of other people, inspiration, 
and experience. It is a process of accre-
tion, that is to say, lifetime learning added 
up, and of inner maturation. The long 
process of growing up as a part of being 
alive is most noticeable in research in 
the humanities, where outstanding work 
is almost never done by young men. 
The addition of further dimensions to 
the material to be classified greatly 
broadens the base of classification. The 
necessity for describing a body of knowl-
edge with no known boundaries, which 
is the real work of classification, calls for 
a type of description which also can have 
no boundaries. In a discussion of the 
future of physics, Albert Einstein wrote: 
The belief in an external world inde-
pendent of the perceiving subject is the ba-
sis of all natural science. Since, however, 
sense perception only gives information of 
this external world or of "physical reality" 
indirectly, we can only grasp the latter by 
speculative means. It follows from this that 
our notions of physical reality can never be 
final. We must always be ready to change 
these notions--that is to say, the axiomatic 
substructure of physics--in order to do jus-
tice to perceived facts in the most logically 
perfect way. Actually a glance at the devel-
opment of physics shows that it has under-
gone far-reaching changes in the course of 
time.3 
This is true of all subjects, and it is this 
truth that has made all ~lassifications ob-
solete over a period of time. So far as 
generalized classification is concerned, 
we have not even discovered most of the 
main categories, to say nothing of the 
thousands of related categories which 
must exist. At best, our classifications are 
an approximation, and subject to con-
stant revision as new information be-
comes available. 
Does this mean that all classification 
is a waste of time, since it can never be 
finished? The answer is "yes" only if by 
8 Albert Einstein, The World As I See It (New 
York: Covici, Friede, 1934), p. 60. 
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classification we mean a process of as-
signing a fixed and -relatively unalterable . 
"address" to each categorical item. An 
ideal classification should be entirely 
flexible. Until all research and scholarly 
efforts cease, there will be no way of 
avoiding major alterations in subject 
organization, and, in fact, there should 
be no question of having anything but 
constant change. In making systems, pro-
vision for this change should be all the 
way through as required, not just at 
marginal spots where it will be the least 
upsetting. As the Indian classification 
theorist, Ranganathan, has ably put it: 
A classificatory language must be nimble 
enough to keep step with the field of knowl-
edge. Its expectation of life is determined 
by the· degree of its self-perpetuating quality, 
i.e., by the smallness of the dependence of 
the classifier on the classificationist [maker 
of the classification] to seize the correct class 
numbers of the new formations. The degree 
of its self-perpetuating quality is determined 
by the notational devices with which it is 
armed.4 
In other words, the classification must be 
flexible enough t<:> cope with unlimited 
additions to itself, and it must not be 
defeated by the notation used with it. 
The notation used in a classification 
is an extremely important feature. Most 
notations are inadequate and actually 
strangle the .classification system in the 
process of trying to reflect its internal 
structure. Something that will break this 
stranglehold and at the same time will 
broaden the class structure by freeing it 
from dependence upon limited criteria 
is a must for the future. It may even 
prove advisable to avoid notation in a 
classification or to use a random number 
system, with no effort to reflect the struc-
ture. 
Classification is and must be a mirror 
of the intellectual as well as the external 
world it seeks to represent. If this com-
4 S. R. Ranganathau, "Self-Perpetuating Scheme of 
Classification," Journal of Documentation, IV (March 
1949), 240. 
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bined world is a reality of four or five or 
more dimensions, the classification must 
have four or more dimensions, with some 
kind of spatial representation for visual-
ization purposes. 
Such a spatial representation is a sine 
qua non of adequate symbolic descrip-
tion of anything approaching reality. To 
use a letter-number string can be un-
wieldy as well as distorting. What this 
spatial representation should be-a frac-
tion, lattice, or matrix in depth, or some-
thing better-cannot now be deter-
mined. The forms suggested seem too 
rigid. One needs a spatial "notation" 
that is more amorphous. 
Such a spatial representation is needed 
for another reason. The human mind 
can cross subject boundary lines without 
much difficulty. Ideas in one field are 
applied or adapted to another with com-
parative ease. It is commonplace for new 
area studies to be set up in academic cir-
cles by drawing upon specialists from 
several fields to bring their different 
backgrounds to bear on a set of problems 
common to all of them. Thus we have 
new programs in space research, brain 
research, biomedical engineering, non-
Western civilization and so on, all inter-
d~J:>artmental affairs. Old geographic di-
VISIOns are replaced by new ones: Sub-
Saharan Africa, Southwest Asia, Middle 
Amer~ca. ~he late Robert C. Binkley, in 
teaching history, broke down ·the vertical 
strea~ of t~me applied to political-geo-
graphic regwns (England since 1485) in-
to horizontal units (all of Europe in 
~ecembe~ 1587). The next step logically 
Is to realize that there is no reason for 
not treating space and time as a unit 
because that is exactly what they are. 
Space-time is a dimension common to 
everything. Even the apparent "here and 
now" of contemporary science has retro-
spective features. For example, scientists 
never cease to remind us that, so far as 
they are concerned, the printed an-
nouncement of new research is already 
out-of-date on the day it appears. This 
means that even as the announcement is 
:ead, it is describing something already 
In retrospect. This has significance-and 
not just in priority struggles. Even if a 
new generalized classification system is 
~o mo:e than an ephemeral conglomera-
tiOn, It has to take into account the 
space-time factor. 
Other dimensions are the Zeitgeist 
and Weltanschauung mentioned earlier. 
Just as no scholar or creative artist func-
ti?ns ~n a ~acuum, so no output, be it a 
soenti~c discovery or a piece of poetry or 
a musical composition, comes from a 
void. 5 All of them have antecedents, and 
sooner or later most also have descend-
ents. There are branches of scholarship 
~hich specialize in locating and study-
Ing connections and relationships among 
things which apparently have sprung 
up d~ novo . . A .classification which only 
descnbes a limited number of qualities 
pertaining to entities and which de-
liberately stultifies itself because it must 
fit into a preconceived code of very lim-
ited proportions has small chance of 
lasting. First a classification must be 
free to cross subject boundary lines as 
freely as our minds cross them. Then the 
notation, if there is one, must be so free 
~hat . th~ classification can expand into 
Infinity In any direction. . 
Another point to be considered in the 
future development of generalized classi-
fication, in addition to taking a clear 
look at the nature of the material to be 
classified and making a flexible system 
while freeing this system from depend-
ence upon notation, is the need to be 
able to show relationships between ele-
ments of a classification system in a com-
pletely unhampered way. This is ex~ 
tremely difficult. Up to now, few classi-
fication schemes, no matter how well 
designed or modified, have been able to 
show area relationships or cross-connec-
5 John Living.ston Lowes, The Road to Xanadu 
(New York: Vmtage Books, 1959) is an interesting 
example. · 
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tions between subjects which pertain to 
two or more fields simultaneously. The 
only solutions attempted have been to 
enter such things in each related spot as 
a recognition of each separate emphasis, 
or to lock the codes for the individual 
related topics together in a linear chain 
or a series of more or less connected 
chains. 
In this respect, a system which can 
build its own class descriptions, as with 
Uniterms, has advantages. With present 
trends in research tending more and 
more to break down existing barriers 
between subjects, and the content of in-
dividual fields being realigned in con-
sequence of this, the barriers between 
subjects, as classically outlined, are a 
positive menace. If growth continues to 
be nonlinear, in the mathematical sense,6 
and expansion continues in revised pat-
terns, added freedom to cross boundaries 
in all directions is a vital necessity. 
A further point is related to the pre-
ceding ones. In a classification, it is not 
only the basic categorical concept that 
is significant, but also the modification 
thereof. The multidimensional quality 
of knowledge is no less complex than the 
multidimensional descriptive possibili-
ties for each individual item in a classi-
fication schedule. Even the descriptive 
terms themselves can be permuted to 
widen the scope of the system. A class 
is by nature an exclusive generalization. 
It is also inclusive, and in this respect 
covers considerable variety, according to 
its criteria. There are as many potential 
classification entities as there are terms 
applicable to the description of an ele-
ment. A classification element, in turn, is 
only a temporary convenience, since it 
is potentially a class in itself, in the light 
of later knowledge. It may also be elim-
inated in the same light. A classification 
system, on the other hand, may never be 
fully described in the terse terms of a 
6 Ladis D. Kovach. " Life Can Be SO Nonlinear" 
American Scientist, XLVIII (June 1960), 2i8-25. ' 
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classification schedule. Actually, the tra-
ditional classification systems have been 
made by arbitrarily selecting some de-
scriptive factors and deliberately ignor-
ing the rest. Indexes to the systems pick 
up some of the alternatives, but only in 
a hit-or-miss fashion. The faceted classi-
fications, by their very nature, attempt 
to allow for a multitude of possible de-
scriptive factors. 
In sorting out the multidescriptive 
.possibilities for classification elements, 
the criteria of the classification system 
are important. In the past, these criteria 
have been unwritten as a rule; in fact, 
it appears that in most cases they have 
been intuitively assigned. Sometimes the 
intuition has been quite realistic, judg-
ing by the state of knowledge at the time 
the systems were made. The science sec-
tions in the Dewey Classification, for 
instance, with the emphasis on paleon-
tology, fit American science in the later 
19th century like a shoe. Unfortunately, 
the creature wearing the shoe turned out 
to be a millipede-a situation with 
which Dewey's successors were never 
able to cope. Ranganathan has departed 
from intuitive practices to the extent of 
trying to spell out the criteria for each 
class. Others are carrying the process 
farther, but as yet there is no general 
agreement on what these criteria should 
be or even on how they should be 
reached.7 
The criteria of classification might 
serve as mental diffraction gratings. 
Something is needed to split concepts 
systematically the way such gratings 
work with rays of light or other rays. It 
would seem that current research on de-
scriptor language8 is a fine beginning, 
but only a beginning. The argumenta-
tive leap which produces a generaliza-
tion from a collection of particulars 
7 For a. summary of the work of the English Classi-
fication Research Group , see D. ] . Foskett, "The 
Classification Research Group, 1952-1962," L ibri, XII 
(1962), 127-38. 
8 B . C. Vickery, On Retrieval System Theory 
(London : Butterworths, 1961), pp. 23-55. 
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must be made and its nature noted. No 
attempt to do this has come at all, per-
haps because of lack of awareness among 
classification makers that such a leap 
exists. Those who work with machines 
may be more alert to this possibility. 
The advent of the giant calculating 
machine has inspired documentalists to 
see if a use cannot be made of it to or-
ganize the tremendous body of knowl-
edge 'which threatens to overwhelm us 
with the products of our own brains. 
Success both in the reduction of mathe-
matical calculations and in handling 
huge masses of factual data in business 
has led to considerable experimentation 
with such machines for. literature search-
ing and information retrieval. Three 
features, among others, stand out as a 
net result of this endeavor. 
First, those concerned with the or-
ganization of knowledge, in attempt to 
make use of the machines, have tended 
to pay more attention to the capability 
of the machine than to the needs of 
the person using the know ledge or of 
the internal makeup of the knowledge 
itself. Early meetings between "hard-
ware" men and librarians were unpro-
ductive because · the librarians asked 
"What can you do?" and the engineers 
said "What do you want done?" Neither 
side understood the answers given by the 
other. Machines with positive talent in 
searching certain kinds of data were de-
signed, but their effort was negated by 
the erroneous assumption that input was 
a simple matter, suitable for untrained 
clerks. After a succession of failures, the 
realization dawned that input is the ma-
jor key to successful output. Here again, 
there was no rapport between the "hard-
ware" men and librarians, who could 
have predicted this result. A productive 
combination of vast experience with clas-
sification and subject analysis on one 
side and brilliant inventiveness of the 
other has not been realized because of 
lack of communication between the two 
groups. This gap has existed because 
there was no common frame of refer-
ence between the two until the "hard-
ware" men tried out their systems and 
in the process made the same mistakes 
that the librarians had made fifty years 
ago. It is to the lasting shame of the 
catalog librarians that so few of them 
have made any attempt to mechanize 
the experienced approach which they 
alone possess. 
The secoQd feature is one that gives 
a false sense of capability to the ma-
chine. On the surface, finding a piece of 
factual data in a mass of other factual 
data appears not unlike finding a box 
of rotary switches in a warehouse full of 
electronic supplies. The joker here is 
that the warehouse is a selective situa-
tion, limited to a homogeneous collec-
tion of highly specialized items, and 
serving a small segment of the total buy-
ing public. If a collection of information 
has the equivalent qualities, homoge-
neity and limited access, then the ma-
chine solution to the problem of infor-
mation retrieval looks pretty good. How-
ever, under such restricted circumstanc-
es, practically anything, including a hier-
archical classification of the most rigid 
type, works well. The difficulty comes 
when the collection becomes hetero-
geneous. 
Even given the same special situation, 
if the information to be retrieved is 
theoretical instead of factual-an idea, 
a line of thought, an argument for or 
against a point, a suggestion for future 
research-the machine falls even flatter 
on its transistorized face than the pld 
classification. The classification at least 
has some way of indicating relationships 
and can give a hint to where to look for 
an answer. The machine is an aU-or-
nothing proposition. 
The third factor is a temptation which 
came with the machine. The very suc-
cess with mathematics, the relatively easy 
manner in which a computer can be 
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programmed to deal with a formula, 'the 
facility with which symbolic logic can 
be handled, all suggested that the thing. 
to do was to find a mathematical model, 
or a series of mathematical models, to 
express the essence of organization of 
knowledge. Fit the data to the model 
and the model to the machine and the 
problem of information retrieval was as 
good as solved. Unfortunately this was 
equivalent to putting the cart before 
the horse, as even the most elementary 
grasp of the scientific method should 
have warned. Quantification-the for-
mula for the law, the shorthand for an 
accepted generalization-is usually the 
last step, not the first, in the whole 
process of organization. Even when one 
begins with a great unifying id'ea, sub-
ject to verification by later observation, 
quantification comes slowly. For infor-
mation retrieval, the mathematical mod-
el, to be satisfactory, has to . wait until 
answers are found to questions that have 
not yet been asked. 
There are many questions to be asked 
and answered before new generalized 
classification systems of any stature can 
be expected. A few of the basic ones 
have been raised in this study: How do 
we represent a multidimensional reality, 
presuming such exists, on paper? How 
do we cross departmental lines in sub-
ject fields with a classification system the 
way the human mind crosses them? How 
do we show relationships between parts 
of a system in a completely unhampered 
way? How do we indicate the multidi-
mensional descriptive possibilities for 
~ach individual item being classified? 
flow do we orient our criteria for classi-
ficati?n in sue~ a way that concepts may 
be ~lffract.ed Into elements in a syste-
matic fashwn? Should we dispense with 
notation altogether? If not, can we use 
something more graphic than a nota-
tion made up of letters and numbers? 
I~ it Rossible to get better spatial percep-
u~n Into our classification systems? It 
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would . be convenient to replace the 
plane and linear by something with 
~epth, perhaps analogous to proper mo-
tiOn and radial velocity in astronomy. 
Can .we a~oid the pitfall of adapting our 
classificatiOn systems to the capability 
of the computer instead of vice versa? 
Can we make a machine that will han-
dle the infinite variety that composes 
the sum total of human knowledge? Will 
our final ~lassification synthesis be capa-
ble of being represented by mathemati-
cal models? 
Th~ lines of development to be pur-
sued In the future make it imperative 
that we also ask questions pertaining to 
methodology: Where can classification 
borr~w ideas, techniques, and philo-
sophic approaches from other disci-
plines? Do we have to stoop to some 
degree of fantasy in our classification 
composition before we can conquer with 
cold, hard facts? In other words, how 
much creative imagination can we put 
into a classification system without los-
ing touch with reality? Is it possible that 
w_e have ~ade .a mistake in tending to 
view classificatiOn as a science rather 
than a art? Is some combination of the 
two, perhaps achieving the rapproche-
ment between science and the humani-
ties that has eluded us, the ultimate 
answer? 
The future of generalized classifica-
~ion d~pends in large part upon man's 
Ingenuity. So far, there has been no limit 
to the capabilities of the human mind, 
and there seems, therefore, to be no 
justification for the . view that classifi-
~ation as a way or organizing knowledge 
Is dead merely because the philosophic 
approaches used · so far have led to blind 
alleys. It is time to look for new ap-
proaches. •• 
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